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Jews in Contemporary Turkey
Franklin Hugh Adler
Though listed as twenty thousand, the Jewish population of con-
temporary Turkey, a country of nearly seventy-one million, is actually 
closer to fifteen thousand and shrinking, a relic of what had been one 
of the most important components of the so-called Ottoman mosaic. At 
the beginning of the Turkish Republic, in 1923, the Jewish population 
was 81,454. In Istanbul alone there were 47,035 Jews, roughly thirteen 
percent of a city that then numbered 373,124.1 Sephardim, those who 
came from Spain and Portugal after the expulsions of 1492, are the 
most celebrated group of Ottoman Jews, for they came to play such 
an important role in commerce, medicine and diplomacy, yet there 
had been an older Romaniot group of Jews that had been living con-
tinuously in Asia Minor from Biblical times, mentioned by Aristotle 
and several Roman sources, including Josephus.2 Jews, in fact, had 
inhabited this land long before the birth of Mohammed and the Islamic 
conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries, or for that matter, the 
arrival and conquests of the Turks, beginning in the eleventh century. 
On the eve of the birth of Islam, most of world Jewry lived under Byz-
antine or Persian rule in the lands of the Mediterranean basin.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s diminished Jewish population of 15,000 is 
the largest concentration of Jews in a predominantly Muslim land, a 
relic not only of what had been a central component of the distinc-
tively Ottoman mosaic, but, more tragically, all that is left of the Jewish 
presence in Levantine society, from North Africa through Asia Minor, 
where Jews also had been a vital and permanent feature in the social, 
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economic and cultural landscape.3 With the rise of Arab nationalism, 
and the creation of the state of Israel, 940,000 Jews were forced to leave 
Arab countries under circumstances often far more brutal than those 
visited upon displaced Palestinians, a population of 726,000, accord-
ing to U.N. sources.4 The large and prosperous Jewish community of 
Baghdad consisted of 77,542 Jews, while 10,537 lived in Basra, and 
10,340 in Mosul.5 It is highly unlikely that Jews will ever reclaim their 
distinguished place in the Arabo-Islamic world, even with changes 
of regime. For example, in February 2004 the Iraqi Governing Coun-
cil quickly approved provisions allowing tens of thousands of exiles 
to return, with the sole exception of Iraqi Jews who had lived there 
continuously for 3,500 years.6 Nevertheless, history is full of surprises 
and unanticipated turns, especially in these ancient lands that have 
witnessed flowers of hope as well as rivers of tears. An examination 
of Jews in contemporary Turkey is thus a window looking out at a 
broader horizon of disappointments and possibilities.
*****
In most respects, Turkish Jews fared far better under the Millet orga-
nizational scheme of the Ottoman Empire than they did under the 
Republic. “For more than three hundred years they lived as a distinct 
unit with its particular religion, culture, and language in the mosaic 
of different religions and ethnic groups that together comprised the 
Ottoman Levant.”7 Though all non-Muslims occupied a subordinate 
position and an inferior juridical status within this scheme, they were 
nevertheless allowed a degree of autonomy in their internal affairs 
that, in certain respects, insulated them from the dysfunctions and 
bureaucratic inertia of the larger society. Jews, Greeks and Armenians 
carved out important niches in the Empire’s economy, developed supe-
rior educational systems, and, with the payment poll tax (cizye) were 
spared onerous duties such as military service. Jews in particular had 
prospered from the place it had cultivated in the old Ottoman structure 
that began to rapidly disintegrate by the end of the eighteenth century. 
The age of reforms, referred to as the Tanzimat, led to political central-
ization, unification, and secularism inspired by the French model, one 
that allowed for none of the communal autonomy that had existed 
earlier. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Millets persisted as a 
cultural and sociological reality, but no longer had juridical status or 
political significance.8
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On the one hand, Jews were largely unprepared for the transition 
from Millet to minority; on the other, the republican political program 
made no serious effort to integrate the non-Muslim communities into 
a new national community. Jews, for the most part, did not speak 
Turkish with great facility, but spoke Ladino (or Judeo-Spanish). If 
they were educated beyond primary schooling, they learned French 
and became one of the largest francophone groups in the region, thanks 
to a network of schools constructed and maintained by French Jews 
through the Alliance Israélite Universelle. Such French influence in the 
Jewish community, together with the Haskalah, or Jewish Enlighten-
ment movement, led to a significant group of Jewish modernizers, 
some of whom (Albert Fua, Emmanuel Carasso and Nissim Mazliach) 
not only supported the Young Turk movement, based in Salonika where 
Jews were particularly influential, but played a leading role. It soon 
became clear, however, that the republican commitment to equality, on 
which Jewish support had been predicated, was substantively empty. 
In effect, the Young Turks appropriated the most dubious aspects of 
the French Jacobin model—relentless unification, centralization and 
cultural homogenization—while rejecting its most democratic ones, 
most specifically a generous universalism and principled commitment 
to equality. What emerged was a pathological compound of top-down 
control and standardization, fused with fanatical ethno-nationalism. 
Instead of creating a new, inclusive civil society based on the historical 
experience of multicultural Ottomanism, the Kemalist project became 
one of so-called Turkicization which left no social, cultural or political 
space for those who were non-Turks and non-Muslims, for those who 
had once enjoyed Millet status, for those who now would become iso-
lated and suspect minorities. When the Republic was founded in 1923, 
non-Muslim bureaucrats were at first treated with suspicion and then 
quickly eliminated.
There were, of course, contingencies that must be noted. The repub-
lican state emerged in a moment, not of peace, but war and crisis. Large 
expanses of the old Ottoman realm were lost in a decade of relentless 
military combat that spanned the Balkan wars of 1912–13, World War 
One, and the Turkish war of independence of 1920–1922. Turks and 
other Muslims had been mistreated in what we now call balkanization, 
as boundaries and populations were caught up in constant struggle. 
Most of the Armenian population perished in Turkish acts of genocide, 
and most of the Greeks were transferred to Greece in return for the 
transfer of most Turks to Turkey. Under these circumstances, creating 
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a new republic could not be disassociated with the project of national 
salvation. This truly had become a tragic moment for dominant nations 
as well as minorities in the region, regardless of political ideology or 
state design. Unlike Greeks and Armenians who were associated with 
hostile neighbors, Jews suffered less, though there had been a strong 
suspicion that the treatment of the Armenians was a warning to the 
other minorities as well. Analytically, it is thus difficult to differentiate 
between anti-Semitism per se and anti-minority prejudice; most likely, 
at this point, the former was subsumed under the latter, as doctrinal 
anti-Semitism, generally speaking, has been alien to the Ottoman expe-
rience. Nevertheless, it is not at all difficult to imagine that, under such 
circumstances, anti-minority sentiment could become transformed into 
anti-Semitism. And, indeed, this is what appears to have happened. In 
1934, pogroms broke out in Thrace whose unprotected Jewish commu-
nities permanently resettled in Istanbul. Turkey did not enter World 
War Two, so its Jews were not exposed to the immediate dangers that 
faced their coreligionists in Europe. In 1941, non-Muslim males were 
conscripted for military service. Not permitted to bear arms, they were 
sent off for forced labor instead. In December 1941, the S.S. Struma 
docked in Istanbul. It was an overloaded, unseaworthy vessel that had 
departed from the Romanian port of Constanta, bound for Palestine 
carrying 767 Jews fleeing the Germans. Its hull leaking and its engine 
malfunctioning, the refugees implored the Turkish government for 
sanctuary. The appeal was denied, and after two months of further 
negotiation the boat with all of its passengers, who the whole time had 
been confined to the ship, was ordered to leave. Five miles at sea in the 
Bosphorus, it sank with the loss of 428 men, 269 women and 70 chil-
dren.9 In November 1942, the discriminatory wealth tax (Varlik Vergisi) 
was levied whereby non-Muslims were assessed at confiscatory rates, 
which were not subject to appeal. Those who could not pay within a 
month were deported for forced labor during the harsh winter, break-
ing stones for a new road at Askale. The press and politicians praised 
the measures against people of “alien blood,” who were “Turks in 
name only.” Under public criticism from the United States, includ-
ing a series of articles in the New York Times, and from other Allied 
powers as the war was turning against the Axis powers, the republic 
stopped enforcing the tax. “Subsequent government inquiries exposed 
the injustices that had been committed, but proposals to compensate 
the victims were never implemented.”10 For many Turkish Jews, this 
was the last straw; by 1949 more than 31,000 left for the new state of 
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Israel where eventually 60,000 would settle, roughly four times the size 
of the present Jewish community in Turkey.
*****
Already during the 1930s it had become clear that a distinctive form 
of anti-Semitism, not simply disdain of Turkey’s minorities, had taken 
root. Cevat Rifat Altilhan, who published the first Turkish editions of 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Hitler’s Mein Kampf, traveled to 
Germany where he met with Nazi leaders who subsidized his dissemi-
nation of German anti-Semitic propaganda. Between 1940 and 1998, 
Mein Kampf was published in twenty-nine separate editions, while the 
Protocols was published ninety-three times between 1934 and 1991.11 
As Rifat Bali, the leading student of Turkish anti-Semitism notes, Tur-
key had rigid censorship during this period that was meticulously 
applied against the Left and the Kurds. One can only wonder why 
it was seldom applied against the nationalists of the extreme right 
and the Islamists, who beyond classically anti-Semitic imported texts 
like those cited, target the Jews as the cause for every misfortune that 
befalls Turkey, beginning with the assertion that it was the Jews who 
foisted the secular state upon the country, through their agent, none 
other than Kemal Ataturk, who allegedly was a dönme, a cryptic Jew.12 
Islamist anti-Semitism became still more radical after the Iranian Revo-
lution, conjuring Jewish or Zionist conspiracies behind every humili-
ation suffered by Muslims in Turkey and throughout the world. And 
yet, despite the dissemination of such venomous tracts, it is difficult 
to ascertain the degree to which it has had an impact on public opin-
ion. Unlike France, for example, there has been no wave of physical 
assaults nor vandalism of property, aside from the attacks of Neve Sha-
lom (Oasis of Peace) synagogue in 1986 and 2003 (the first conducted 
by Palestinians associated with Abu Nidal; the second by Turkish pre-
sumptive associates of Al-Qaida). Turkish Jews have serious security 
concerns in the wake of the bombings of Neve Shalom and the Sisli 
synagogues in November 2003, but these are centered on distinctively 
Jewish sites and institutions, not the fear typical of French Jews con-
cerning attacks in public spaces or personal property.
The Jewish community continues to live in a world of dhimmitude 
where subordinate status and second-class citizenship is uncontested. 
Turkish Jews, as many scholars have pointed out, prefer to remain 
“hidden” and apolitical, traits that they brought even to Israel, accord-
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ing to one study entitled The Unseen Israelis. There are no prominent 
social critics who are Jews, as incredible as that might sound, only one 
major journalist, and only a handful of academics in non-technical dis-
ciplines. The Jewish community of Turkey has produced no shortage 
of world-class scholars (Seyla Benhabib, Aaron Rodrigue, Esther Ben-
bassa, Riva Kastoryano, Nora Seni, Dani Rodrik, Mahir Shaul, Karen 
and Henri Barkey, to name a few), but, as Rifat Bali suggests, they were 
mostly trained and made their reputations abroad, in Israel, Europe, 
or the United States. Jewish children know they will never hold high 
public office, and are steered mostly toward commerce, engineering, 
or the physical sciences.
Lina Filiba, vice-president of the Jewish Community, argues that 
quiet diplomacy, not contestation, has worked to their advantage 
compared to the treatment of other minorities. In this way, they have 
secured permission to construct new synagogues and enhance existing 
structures, as well as other benefits. Relations with the present Islamist 
ruling party, she maintains, are especially good because as believers, 
not secularists, they understand and respect the spiritual needs of the 
Jewish community. Bension Pinto, president of the Jewish Community, 
says that things are “a thousand times better than before,” though he 
could not predict how long this will remain the case.13 In response to 
Jewish critics, such as the historian Rifat Bali, who argue that the com-
munity’s complicity in dhimmitude has made the situation worse, Lina 
Filiba responds by saying that the community has not been passive or 
submissive in quietly defending Jewish interests, but has diplomatic 
cards of its own that occasionally have been played, most importantly 
relations with American Jews whose political clout successive Turk-
ish governments has needed to counter the influence of Greek and 
Armenians lobbies on obvious issues. Anything that endangers or dis-
advantages Turkish Jews, she suggested, would have immediate and 
potentially devastating diplomatic consequences. In fact, the Turkish 
government occasionally treated its Jewish community as a pawn, not 
a recognized force, when dealing with American Jews. For example, in 
1988 Ambassador Sükü Alekdag threatened that if the U.S. Holocaust 
Museum made any reference whatsoever to the Armenians, “it will go 
badly for the Jews in Turkey. Also for the refugees from Iran. We per-
mit them to cross into our territory, you know, even without passports. 
That could all stop.”14
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*****
There are two alternative futures that confront the Turkish Jewish com-
munity. The first is further diminution, a continuation of the pattern 
that has persisted since the creation of the Republic in 1923. If not 
entire families, children, especially those who pursued their university 
studies abroad, will remain in Israel, Europe or the United States. A 
brain drain has taken place during the past twenty years affecting all 
Turks, not just Jews. Among better educated and more affluent Turk-
ish families, more relatives than ever before have settled abroad where 
opportunities in the academy, science and commerce are more plentiful 
and far better paid. As Jews are disproportionately represented in this 
group, but comprise a vastly smaller population, the differential effect 
on the Jewish community would be far more pronounced than among 
Turks in general. In fact, this is the future anticipated by leadership 
of the Jewish community; that it will become smaller quantitatively 
though hopefully better qualitatively.
Alternatively, one could imagine a more optimistic future if the 
Turkish economy prospers, especially if accession to the European 
Union takes place, securing external guarantees for human rights and 
the genesis of a more open, dynamic civil society where equality for all 
Turks might become possible. Under such circumstances, Jews might 
return to Turkey and reconstitute the dwindling community. Despite 
the vicissitudes of Middle East politics, and the emergence of an ever 
more popular Islamist party, relations between Turkey and Israel in 
trade, as well as security, have remained strong. Unlike other Mus-
lim countries, Jews who left can always return to visit or remain. In 
terms of tourism, Turkey, one hour away by air, has become a prime 
Israeli venue, attracting 300,000 tourists per year. One striking aspect 
of globalization has been the rise of so called “transnationals” who for 
professional reasons have multiple residences. If the Turkish economy 
continues to grow, and if trade and technical relations with Israel con-
tinue to develop, transnational Jews might become a new element 
of Turkey’s Jewish community. One could well imagine transnational 
Jews originating from Europe and perhaps America as well. Of course, 
should meaningful and lasting peace come to the Middle East, condi-
tions would be created for émigré Jews to return to all of their Levan-
tine homelands, not just Turkey, where with Muslims they could 
reconstitute what had once been such a vital, diverse, multicultural 
space. •
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